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COMMENTS
Ignorance as Bliss? The Historical
Development of an American
Rule on Juror Knowledge
Edward J. Finley It
The institution of trial by jury contains within itself a seeming
paradox. On the one hand, jurors are likely to have some personal
knowledge about a case, the parties or the witnesses because jurors
are drawn from the vicinage.1 While that might have been more
true in the sixteenth century than today, one can still expect jurors
from the neighborhood to come to trial with some background
knowledge about the case.2 In fact, two recent studies reveal that
jurors today rely on personal knowledge with surprising
frequency.'
On the other hand, the common law guarantee of a jury of
"indifferent" peers" seems to militate against jurors who come to
trial with any personal knowledge of the case. Intuitively, one
might argue that a juror with personal knowledge, at worst, will be
predisposed against one side, or, at least, might decide a case con-
trary to the evidence presented in court. In either case, empanel-
t B.A. 1987, University of Virginia; J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Chicago.
An ancient common law term denoting the neighborhood in which the transaction or
crime took place. Black's Law Dictionary 1405 (West, 5th'ed 1979).
' See J.B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 91 (1898),
and text accompanying notes 34-75.
' See D.W. Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical Look, 45
Neb L Rev 99 (1966). Utilizing data from 23 jury trials held in federal district court in the
Midwest (16 civil trials and seven criminal trials), Broeder describes "the use made by ju-
rors of the assorted store of information one acquires about his neighborhood by living there
.... .Id at 101. He found that in ten out of 14 civil trials (two were settled and one was
reversed by the Court of Appeals) and in three out of seven criminal trials juror knowledge
of local conditions played a part in their verdict. Id at 101-02. See also John H. Mansfield,
Jury Notice, 74 Georgetown L J 395, 396 (1985).
' 3 The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 234 at 155a note d and
155b (Luke Hansard & Sons, 16th ed 1809) ("Coke Upon Littleton").
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ling jurors with personal knowledge seemingly jeopardizes fair and
impartial adjudication.
Lawyers and jurists have debated whether jurors should have
or use personal knowledge for at least two hundred years. The
American rule today, as stated by Professor Wigmore, is that a
person who has any personal knowledge about the case, except of
the most general nature, may not serve as a juror.e Furthermore, a
judgment rendered by a jury that has relied on personal knowledge
can be vacated and remanded for a new trial. This Comment will
explore the historical development of the American rule regarding
juror knowledge.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, ju-
rors often came to trial with personal knowledge about the case. In
fact, most courts at that time willingly deferred to a jury's determi-
nation on the grounds that jurors might have some knowledge of
their own.8 Courts were sensitive, however, to concerns about im-
partiality. All personal knowledge, therefore, was not treated
uniformly.
Jurors who had knowledge obtained by direct observation or
experience ("direct knowledge") were required to present their evi-
dence in open court. Such jurors, however, were not systematically
excluded from juries.' Instead, courts would exclude only those
I See, for example, Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep 1066 (CP 1670); and the discussion in
John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor- Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of
the English Civil Juror, 32 Am J Legal Hist 201, 203 (1988).
0 See John Henry Wigmore, 6 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1800 at 331 (Little,
Brown & Co., 1976): today jurors may use personal knowledge that is 1) of matters akin to
judicial notice; 2) from a view of a site (but see limitations in § 1168); or 3) (a) notorious, (b)
general, and (c) unquestioned. The requirement that knowledge is of a general nature is
limited to such knowledge that is common to the "human experience." See Mansfield, Jury
Notice, 74 Georgetown L J at 396 (cited in note 3). But compare A. Leo Levin and Robert J.
Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105
U Pa L Rev 139 (1956).
Wigmore, 9 Evidence § 2570 at 726 (cited in note 6).
' See, for example, Woodruff v Whittlesey, 1 Kirby 60, 61-62 (Conn 1786); Carpenter v
Child, 1 Root 220, 220 (Conn 1790) (even though only one bit of evidence was presented at
trial, itself insufficient for a verdict, the court could not order a new trial); Smith v Bradley,
1 Root 150, 150 (Conn 1790) ("It is no cause of arrest that the jury have found their verdict
upon insufficient evidence, for they are judges of the weight of the evidence."); State v Ben-
nett, 3 Brev 514 (SC 1815) (jury has a right to find facts contrary to the judge's view of the
evidence). In Connecticut, for example, in 1794 a trial court "accepted said verdict contrary
to [the court's] own opinions upon the evidence as it appeared to them, upon an idea that
the jury, who were acquainted with the witnesses, discovered some defect in [the witnesses')
credibility, which the court were unacquainted with." Miller v Talcot, 2 Root 115, 117
(Conn 1794).
' See text accompanying notes 76-85.
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who were partial as a result of their direct knowledge. 10 During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts began system-
atically to exclude jurors who had any direct knowledge."
Nineteenth-century courts judged jurors who had knowledge
about a case obtained from rumor, newspapers or repute ("vicari-
ous knowledge") in the same way that they judged jurors' opinions.
Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century courts excluded po-
tential jurors only if such vicarious knowledge rendered them par-
tial.12 At the same time, courts were particularly tolerant of jurors'
use of vicarious knowledge. 3 During the last third of the nine-
teenth century, many state legislatures passed statutes prohibiting
jurors' use of personal knowledge.' Courts nevertheless continued
to apply their traditional rule, though somewhat more narrowly.'"
Part I of this Comment briefly outlines the history of the En-
glish jury until the 1760s, the background against which eight-
eenth-century American colonists viewed the role of the jury.
Part II, itself divided into two sections, describes the develop-
ment of American rules governing the state of a juror's mind. Sec-
tion A treats the rules regarding exclusion of a juror for having a
prejudicial opinion. Those rules also reveal what kind of personal
knowledge would render a potential juror incompetent, since opin-
ion is naturally founded upon some knowledge. Section B treats
the rules regarding use of personal knowledge, distinguishing be-
tween direct knowledge and vicarious knowledge. Because vicari-
ous knowledge affects by far the greatest number of potential ju-
rors and has been the subject of the most dispute recently, 6 it is
the focus of this section.
I. THE ENGLISH JURY BEFORE THE 1760S
In the first English jury trials, jurors were expected to come to
trial with personal knowledge.' 7 That is not to say that jurors pos-
sessed first-hand knowledge.'8 As Maitland explained, "even in the
"0 See text accompanying note 86.
" See text accompanying note 88.
" See text accompanying notes 34-75.
" See text accompanying notes 89-111.
"4 See note 112.
15 See text accompanying notes 117-28.
" See, for example, Thomas Szasz, Whose Competence; Determination of Competence
of Juries and Defendants, 41 Natl Rev 38 (Sept 15, 1989).
1" Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 203 (cited in-note 5), citing W.S. Holdsworth, 1 A
History of English Law 333-34 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed 1922).
is Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 203-04 (cited in note 5).
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early years of the thirteenth century [jurors] were not, and were
hardly supposed to be, eye-witnesses."" Instead, they were ex-
pected to prepare themselves for trial by seeking out and infor-
mally consulting witnesses. ' ° These jurors, as investigators, would
then deliver a verdict based upon what they had learned.2
Over time, both witnesses and jurors began to appear at court
to be interrogated in public by the judge, and eventually witnesses
testified publicly before the jury.2 Even then, jurors could use per-
sonal knowledge, so long as they testified in open court and the
judge was satisfied that the juror was not prejudiced."
Professor Mitnick has found evidence that, from as early as
1650, English courts were willing to restrict the jury's use of per-
sonal knowledge." Some, like Professor Langbein, suggest that by
the late seventeenth century there was a well-settled doctrine
against jurors' use of any personal knowledge.2 5 Yet in 1670,
Bushell's Case2 6 cast doubt on this interpretation when Justice
Vaughan explicitly recognized a juror's right to use personal
knowledge.
'" Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland, 2 The History of English Law
628 (Cambridge, 2d ed 1899).
20 W.S. Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law at 332-33 (cited in note 17).
21 Id.
21 Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 204 (cited in note 5), citing W. Forsyth, History of
Trial By Jury 128 (1875).
22 See William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England *375 (1768; re-
printed by University of Chicago Press, 1978); Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1800 at 331 (cited in
note 6).
2 Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 209-29 (cited in note 5), citing Bennett v The Hun-
dred of Hartford, 82 Eng Rep 671, 672 (Upper Bench 1650).
"* John Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U Chi L Rev 263, 298-99
n 105 (1978).
26 124 Eng Rep 1066 (CP 1670).
17 Id at 1012:
Without a fact agreed, it is as impossible for a Judge, or any other, to know the
law relating to that fact .. . .But the Judge, qua Judge, cannot know the fact
possibly, but from the evidence which the jury have, but (as will appear) he can
never know what evidence the jury have ... [bleing return'd of the vicinage,
whence the cause of action ariseth, the law supposeth them thence to have suffi-
cient knowledge to try the matter in issue ... though no evidence were given on
either side in Court ... [tihey may have evidence from their own personal knowl-
edge ... that what is depos'd in Court, is absolutely false .... The jury may know
the witnesses to be stigmatiz'd and infamous, which may be unknown to the ...
Court .. . , [the jury have viewed the site, giving them] better information ....
See also Trial of Nathanial Reading, 7 Howell's State Trials 259, 267 (KB 1679) ("And do
you challenge a juryman because he is supposed to know something of the matter? For that
reason the juries are called from the neighbourhood, because they should not be wholly
strangers to the fact.").
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According to Vaughan's reasoning, a judge could not punish a
jury for attaint" since "they may have evidence from their own
personal knowledge ... that what is depos'd in Court, is absolutely
false ... [and] may know the witnesses to be stigmatiz'd and infa-
mous, which may be unknown" to the court.2 9 Langbein has criti-
cized this decision as "wilfully anachronistic," since he doubts that
jurors at the time actually had any personal knowledge.3 ° Never-
theless, Vaughan's statement of the law continued in the treatises
well into the middle of the eighteenth century.31
Some have argued that Bushell's Case was simply an aberration since Vaughan primar-
ily sought to abolish the system of attaint, using juror knowledge as a rationalization for his
decision. See, for example, Langbein, 45 U Chi L Rev at 298-99, n 105 (cited in note 25)
(stating that Vaughan's argument was "dishonest nonsense" and "wilfully anachronistic");
and John A. Phillips and Thomas C. Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England:
The Penn/Mead Trial and Bushell's Case, 4 Law & Inequality 189, 216-17 n 145 (1986) and
cases cited.
28 In old English practice, [an attaint was] a writ which lay to inquire whether a
jury of twelve men had given a false verdict, in order that the judgment might be
reversed. . . This inquiry was made by a grand assise or jury of twenty-four
persons, usually knights, and, if they found the verdict a false one, the judgment
was that the jurors should become infamous, should forfeit their goods and the
profits of their lands, should themselves be imprisoned, and their wives and chil-
dren thrust out of doors, should have their houses razed, their trees extirpated,
and their meadows plowed up, and that the plaintiff should be restored to all that
he lost by reason of the unjust verdict.
Black's Law Dictionary 116 (West, 5th ed 1979), citing Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at
*404.
The harshness of the penalty prevented the law from being executed and so Parliament
enacted a statutory alternative, which imposed merely perpetual infamy and a fine. Black-
stone, 3 Commentaries at *403-04, citing 11 Henry VII, ch 24, and 23 Henry VIII, ch 3
(cited in note 23).
" Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep at 1012. Vaughan's arguments do not justify a juror's
use of direct knowledge, but focus instead on vicarious knowledge that might be used in
judging credibility or in weighing the evidence.
"o Langbein, 45 U Chi L Rev at 298-99 n 105 (cited in note 25).
3' Mitnick, 32 Am J Legal Hist at 219-20 (cited in note 5), citing many English treatises
echoing Vaughan's opinion, including: John Brydall, Enchiridion Legum 109 (1673) ("the
jury ... may find veritatem facti upon circumstances, or by witnesses, or sometimes (espe-
cially for want of manifest or probable evidence) upoh their own knowledges"); John
Hawles, The English-Mans Right 29 (1680); Giles Duncombe, Trials Per Pais 225 (6th ed
1725) ("the judge cannot fully know upon what evidence the jury give their verdict; for they
may have other evidence than what is shewed in court"); John Somers, The Security of
English Men's Lives 11 (1681); William Style, Style's Practical Register 335, 339 (4th ed
1707); Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England 601 (3d ed 1724); Anon, A
Guide to English Juries 11 (1725); Anon, The Complete Juryman 187 (1752); Richard
Burn, 2 The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer 59 (1755) (British Library: 883 1 15);
Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence 134-35 (1760) (British Library: 228 h 12); M. Bacon,
3 A New Abridgement of the Law 778 (5th ed 1798).
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By the latter part of the eighteenth century the law in Eng-
land was rather well-settled that jurors were prohibited from using
any private knowledge. 2 In 1768, William Blackstone explained:
As to such evidence as the jury may have in their own
consciences, by their private knowlege of facts, it was an
antient doctrine, that this had as much right to sway
their judgment as the written or parol evidence which is
delivered in court. [But] this doctrine was gradually ex-
ploded . . . [and the practice] now universally obtains,
that if a juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he
may be sworn as a witness, and give his evidence publicly
in court. 33
II. THE CONTOURS OF THE AMERICAN RULE
American courts throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries treated the question of personal knowledge as a question
of the opinion it left on a juror's mind. This is a natural enough
course to take: one's opinion must be founded upon what one
knows. Having admitted jurors with personal knowledge, courts
regulated jurors' use of personal knowledge by analyzing the source
of the knowledge. Different state courts formulated the rule differ-
ently, but they essentially inquired into whether a juror's personal
knowledge created an opinion that left him partial.
3 Scholars disagree on exactly when the prohibition began. Compare Mitnick, 32 Am J
Legal Hist at 201, 209-26 (cited in note 5), who describes a de facto prohibition, beginning
with the creation of the motion for a new trial in 1391 (Wantley v White, Coram Rege Roll
no 522, m 7 (KB 1391), reprinted in 7 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench: Richard
II, Henry IV and Henry V 80, 82 (Selden Society, 1971)) and culminating in two
eighteenth-century cases that, in practice, prohibited jurors' use of personal knowledge
(Dormer v Parkerhurst, 95 Eng Rep 414 (KB 1738); and Bright v Eynon, 97 Eng Rep 365,
366 (KB 1757)); Edward Jenks, According to the Evidence, in Cambridge Legal Essays 191
(W. Heifer & Sons, 1926) (identifying the precise date of the modern rule as 1757 when
King's Bench, in Bright v Eynon, 97 Eng Rep 365, 366 (KB 1757), announced a general rule
for ordering new trials in civil cases); Margaret C. Klingelsmith, New Readings of Old Law,
66 U Pa L Rev 107 (1918) (no such development took place at all); and Patrick Devlin, The
Judge 126-27, 131-32, 135-36 (Oxford, 1979) (describing the development as one driven by
political judges who strove to control verdicts).
11 Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at *374-75 (cited in note 23). In contrast to Vaughan's
arguments, see note 27, Blackstone's statement focuses on "direct knowledge of facts." Id at
*375 (emphasis added). However, even if Blackstone meant to include all personal knowl-
edge in the prohibition, it is important to note that such jurors were not incompetent but




A. Personal Knowledge and Opinion
Holding an opinion never automatically excluded a juror. Sir
Edward Coke in his translation of Littleton enunciated the famous
doctrine that a juror should "stand as indifferent as he stands un-
sworne." 34 But that rule did not require a juror to be ignorant. Af-
ter all, Coke later said that the trial ought to be held in the parish
where the event occurred, because "the inhabitants whereof may
have the better and more certain knowledge of the fact."35
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Ameri-
can courts adhered to Coke's principle. By 1870, courts would ex-
clude only jurors who had expressed a decided opinion on the mer-
its of the case. Courts explained the rule in various ways. For
example, the supreme court of Connecticut declared in 1788:
It is enough in point of indifferency, that jurors have no
interest of their own affected, and no personal bias, or
prepossession, in favor or against either party; and not
requisite that they should be ignorant of the cause, or
unopinionated, as to the rules and principles by which it
is to be decided."
In that case the trial court empaneled a juror who had de-
clared an opinion that "no negro, by the laws of this state, could be
holden a slave. '37 The plaintiff, a black man who was suing several
men who had seized him upon the mistaken presumption that he
was a runaway slave, prevailed at trial.38 The Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld the trial judge's decision to empanel the juror.3 9
In the famous 1807 trial of Aaron Burr for treason, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall excluded jurors who had opinions only "if the opin-
ion formed be on a point so essential as to go far towards a deci-
34 Coke Upon Littleton § 234 at 155a note d and 155b (cited in note 4).
35 Id.
36 Pettis v Warren, 1 Kirby 426, 427-28 (Conn 1788) (emphasis in original). See also
Miller v Talcot, 2 Root at 117; and Case of Fries, 9 F Cases 826, 846 (D Pa 1799) ("if from
his knowledge of the case, and not from ill-will to the party, [a juror] has only declared his
opinion, it is no cause of challenge"). Compare the same language in W. Hawkins, 2 A Trea-
tise of the Pleas of the Crown ch 43, § 28 at 577-78 (C. Roworth, 8th ed 1824); and Irvin v
Dowd, 366 US 717, 722-23. (1960) ("It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally
ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse
methods of communication ... scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not
have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.").
37 Pettis v Warren, 1 Kirby at 426 (cited in note 36).
39 Id.
31 Id at 427-28.
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sion of the whole case."' A juror in that case had said that if what
he had heard about Aaron Burr were true, Burr was guilty of trea-
son." Marshall noted that this was a tentative opinion, formed
upon rumor, and therefore did not render the juror incompetent.2
The Chief Justice explained the concerns that were typical to
courts at the time:
To say that any man who had formed an opinion on any
fact conducive to the final decision of the case would
therefore be considered as disqualified from serving on
the jury, would exclude intelligent and observing men,
whose minds were really in a situation to decide upon the
whole case according to the testimony, and would per-
haps be applying the letter of the rule requiring an im-
partial jury with a strictness which is not necessary for
the preservation of the rule itself.'3
A transient opinion, even that the defendant was guilty, did
not render the juror partial. Thus even jurors who had previously
served on a jury in. a case between the same plaintiff and a differ-
ent insurance company arising out of the same set of facts were
competent, since any opinions they had formed were hypotheti-
cal." Likewise a juror who had read about the defendant sheriff's
alleged failure to account for certain funds was competent since he
said that if the evidence were even it would be a hard case.' 5
A firm opinion, however, especially if it went to the merits of
the case, disqualified a juror. For example, an Illinois juror who
expressed an opinion that Texas cattle would communicate disease
to native cattle-the main issue in the controversy-was incompe-
tent, despite the fact that the legislature had enacted a statute
prohibiting Texas cattle for that very reason.'6 On the latter point
the court explained that a juror could not defend his fixed opinion
on the grounds that the legislature had determined the question.
While the legislature might have expressed its opinion, the statute
was not determinative on the question of fact to be adjudged by a
jury.'7




" Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v Ward, 90 I1 545, 546-47 (1878).
41 Gradle v Hoffman, 105 I11 147, 152 (1882).




Likewise, in an action against a toll-keeper for taking an ex-
cessive toll, a juror who had previously said that the toll charged
by the defendant was unlawful and not authorized by the statute,
was incompetent." And a juror who had said that a slander 'de-
fendant "talked too much" about the plaintiff and ought to "pay
for it" was also incompetent. 9
Judging a potential juror's opinions was not a simple task.
Nineteenth-century courts treated some objections for opinion as
principal challenges.50 In cases where the source of a juror's knowl-
edge was a party to the suit or a witness, one who raised a princi-
pal challenge needed no further evidence to prove partiality.
In Rollins v Ames,51 for example, the court held that the
plaintiff's magistrate52 was incompetent to serve as a juror, since it
was well-known that magistrates were people who, if not un-
friendly to the opposing party, were favorably disposed to the
party for whom, they worked."'
Likewise, the Kansas Supreme Court held incompetent a juror
who was the plaintiff's neighbor, had visited the plaintiff in the
hospital and had conversed about the accident and the plaintiff's
injuries, despite the juror's statement that he had formed no opin-
ion except that the plaintiff had been injured by someone."' The
same was true in Alabama when a potential juror was told by the
plaintiff that the defendant was trying to beat the plaintiff out of
money that was rightfully his.5
In other cases, where the affiliation was more attenuated,
courts required some evidence before excluding a juror. For exam-
ple, Virginia's high court rejected the argument that two jurors
were prejudiced who had signed a petition requesting that the leg-
48 Blake v Millspaugh, 1 Johns 316, 318 (NY 1806).
", Vennum v Harwood, 6 Ill 659, 661-63 (1844).
" A principal challenge raised a fact that showed prima facie partiality. The law pre-
sumed partiality from the fact without requiring further evidence that the juror was indeed
partial. Examples of principal challenges are challenges for affinity, such as being the rela-
tive or a business partner of a party. See, generally, Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at *363
(cited in note 23). See also the discussion in State v Howard, 17 NH 171, 191-92 (1845).
51 2 NH 349 (1821).
"' The case defines a magistrate as one appointed by a party to take depositions to be
entered into evidence. Id at 349.
" Id at 349, 356. The court also noted that the magistrate had heard the plaintiff's
evidence in advance and would have come to trial with prejudice. Id.
" City of Salina v Trosper, 27 Kan 544, 552-54 (1882).
" US Rolling Stock v Weir, 96 Ala 396 (1892). But see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
RR v Perkins, 125 Ill 127, 129-30 (1888) (juror who had heard about the accident at railroad
crossing and heard neighbors discuss the facts was competent):
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islature operate a ferry near the plaintiff's ferry.56 The evidence
did not show that the jurors were disposed against the plaintiff,
the court held. 7
Similarly, in several late nineteenth-century cases from the
West, courts held that potential jurors were not disqualified in
criminal cases of horse stealing merely because they belonged to
various Societies to Prevent Horse Stealing." Likewise, in New
York, jurors who were members of the Freemasons were not pre-
sumptively biased if one of the parties to a suit was also a Freema-
son and the other was not.59
Several states, such as Illinois, treated objections to a poten-
tial juror's opinion, regardless of its source, ° under the more
defential challenges for favor." A party making a challenge for
favor would have to present evidence proving that the juror was
partial. Thus the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a ju-
ror's saying he had no doubt that the defendant had killed the vic-
tim and that the defendant ought to be hung without a jury, 2 was
not sufficient to exclude the juror without more evidence showing
ill-feeling or a fixed belief.6
Opinions based on facts, the accuracy of which the juror was
unsure, were also not grounds for exclusion without more evidence
of partiality. 4 For example, in an 1848 prosecution for performing
" Somerville v Wimbish, 7 Grat 205, 208-09 (Va 1850).
57 Id.
" See, for example, Boyle v People, 4 Colo 176 (1878); State v Wilson, 8 Iowa 407
(1859); State v Flack, 48 Kan 146 (1892).
" People v Horton, 13 Wend 9 (NY 1834).
"0 Smith v Eames, 4 Ill 76, 80-81 (1841):
We lay down this rule, that if the juror has made up a decided opinion on the
merits of the case, either from personal knowledge of the facts, from the state-
ments of witnesses, from the relations of the parties, or either of them, or from
rumor, and that opinion is positive, and not hypothetical, and such as will proba-
bly prevent him from giving an impartial verdict, the challenge should be allowed.
See also Collins v People, 48 Ill 145, 147 (1868) ("if a juror has a decided opinion respecting
the merits of the controversy, either from personal knowledge of the facts, from the state-
ments of witnesses, from the relation of the parties, or from rumor, he is disqualified from
trying the case, if challenged for cause").
61 Challenges for favor raised a fact that implied probable bias. The court, or in some
states triers, would then hear evidence and ascertain if the potential juror was partial. See,
generally, Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at *363 (cited in note 23); and the discussion in
State v Howard, 17 NH at 191-92.
62 State v Howard, 17 NH at 187.
6 Id at 189-90, 194-95.
64 See, for example, Baxter v People, 3 Gilm 368, 376-77 (Ill 1846) (juror is incompetent
if his "belief is established from facts, of the truth of which he has no reasonable doubt, of
the guilt or innocence of the accused or that one party or the other should recover"); and
Gray v People, 26 Ill 344, 347 (1861) (An opinion based on news reports that the juror
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an abortion, a juror was admitted who had had an "opinion unfa-
vorable to the general character of the defendant, and that he had
formed and still retained an impression that if what he had read in
the papers was true, she had committed the act charged. ' 6 The
New York high court found that the opinion was hypothetical and
held that only if evidence showed that the juror's opinion was
strongly held should the juror be excluded.6
Even a strong opinion as to the defendant's guilt was insuffi-
cient to disqualify a potential juror if the opinion was founded on
rumor and newspaper reports. The Maryland Supreme Court so
held in 1879,67 explaining:
the newspaper is now read by everyone and the press is
ever ready and eager to furnish the details of crime. And
although persons may upon such statements form an
opinion, yet it is one in the most cases liable to qualifica-
tion or modification, according to the real facts of the
case.
6 8
And in Mitchum v State,69 Georgia's high court seated a juror who
had said before trial that if the testimony was what he had already
heard of the facts, then the defendant was guilty, on the grounds
that the statements did not evince a fixed opinion. 0 It is interest-
ing to note the court's accusation that such statements had become
devices "to evade jury duty which [are] becoming but too frequent,
and meriting not only censure, but in a proper case,
punishment. '71
The distinction between fixed and transient opinions was not
a very clear one, however. It required courts to dissect a potential
juror's statement for words that suggested mental conviction. Con-
sequently, a potential juror who had said "from what he knew, he
would stretch the prisoner" was incompetent because he had as-
serted that he "knew," not that he had "heard. '7 2 Yet a juror who
said that "the community ought to have taken up [the defendant],
and hung him without a trial" might have been competent if he
believes are true is sufficient to make juror incompetent. Knowledge itself is not objectiona-
ble; it is the opinion that renders the juror incompetent.).
11 People v Lohman, 2 Barb 216, 222 (NY 1848).
66 Id at 222.
6 Waters v State, 51 Md 430, 435-38 (1879).
6 Id at 438.
6 11 Ga 615 (1852).
70 Id at 636.
71 Id.
72 Monroe v State, 5 Ga 85, 139-40 (1848).
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had told the trial court that he based his statement on what he
had heard about the case and not on what he knew.13 A juror was
competent, however, who had conversed with a witness about the
facts, believed the witness and formed an opinion based on what
he was told, on the grounds that his opinion did not go to the guilt
of the prisoner.7' In some cases the distinction was easy, 5 but in
most cases it depended on the court's intuition.
Lasting until the end of the nineteenth century, the resulting
body of law was deferential to most opinions, especially those
founded on knowledge obtained by rumor or repute. Courts em-
paneled jurors who knew about a case or had an opinion on the
merits as long as the opinion was loosely held or obtained from
rumor. Courts regularly conducted inquiries into a potential juror's
opinions but seemed to require a high level of proof of partiality
before excluding a potential juror.
B. Using Personal Knowledge
Since jurors with opinions based on personal knowledge were
competent in many cases, the next question to consider is whether
jurors could use their personal knowledge. Courts seemingly distin-
guished between direct and vicarious knowledge, permitting jurors
to use only the latter until the end of the nineteenth century. Re-
sponding to the statutes passed in the late nineteenth century for-
bidding jurors from using personal knowledge, courts merely nar-
rowed the kind and amount of personal knowledge that jurors were
permitted to use.
1. Direct Knowledge.
Direct knowledge of facts results from having been a witness
to some event or having experienced some fact. By 1793, a verdict
could be set aside if a juror had used direct knowledge. For exam-
ple, a Connecticut juror saw the plaintiff selling horses in Warren,
Connecticut, on the day the plaintiff claimed to have been some-
where else. He shared this with his fellow jurors in order to dis-
credit the plaintiff's testimony. The jury returned a verdict for the
" Anderson v State, 14 Ga 709, 712, 714 (1854).
" Thompson v People, 24 Il 60, 66 (1860). See also Roy v State, 2 Kan 405, 408-09
(1864) (juror who lived six miles from the scene of a murder and who heard a detailed
statement of the case from a neighbor was competent because he heard only rumor).
75 See, for example, Sellers v People, 4 I1 412, 413, 416 (1842), in which a juror was
held incompetent who had said that "[the defendant] would be hung, and that he ought to
be hung, and that nothing could save him; that salt could not save him ... and that there
was no law to clear him."
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defendant. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that
relating such knowledge warranted setting aside the verdict.7 6
The rule in Tennessee in 1872 was similar. In Wade v
Ordway," a juror who visited the scene in order to determine if the
plaintiff could have seen the defendant from the floor, as he al-
leged, shared that information with the other jurors. The court
held that the juror's use of his personal knowledge was improper. 8
The rule applied regardless of whether the jury was swayed by the
information, the court went on to say, because it is a rule "long
established and inflexible, to which no exception can be admitted;
either in civil or criminal issues. '79
The court reasoned that a juror's direct knowledge is not
presented under oath, is without any notice to those affected, and
affords no opportunity for rebuttal.80 Therefore, it is extremely dif-
ficult for a court to assure the veracity of the information. The
safeguards found in public testimony, subject to cross examination
and given under oath, are sufficient to cure any doubts about its
veracity.
Persons who had direct knowledge, however, were not incom-
petent to be jurors unless that knowledge left them partial. The
rule laid down by Blackstone required that "if a juror know any
thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a witness, and
give his evidence publicly in court."'" The court in Wade v
Ordway did not say that the juror had to be excluded, but required
him to testify in court.82 This was the general rule in this country
for most of the nineteenth century and, in some states, into the
twentieth century.8
76 Talmadge v Northrop, 1 Root 522, 523 (Conn 1793).
17 60 Tenn 229, 238 (1872).
Id at 240-41.
Id at 241, citing Sam v State, 1 Swan 61, 65 (Tenn 1851).
80 Id at 240, quoting Donston v State, 6 Humph 275, 276 (Tenn 1845).
81 Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at *375 (emphasis added) (cited in note 23).
82 Wade v Ordway, 60 Tenn at 240-41.
See, for example, People v Boford, 117 Cal App 2d 576 (1953); Savannah v Quo, 103
Ga 125 (1897); Atkins v State, 7 Ga App 201 (1909); Williams v State, 42 Ga App 225
(1931); Curtis v Burney, 55 Ga App 552 (1937); Tumlin v State, 88 Ga App 713 (1953);
Cramer v Burlington, 42 Iowa 315 (1875); State v Cavanaugh, 98 Iowa 688 (1896); Fellows
Case, 5 Me 333 (1828); Handly v Call, 30 Me 9 (1849); Hastings v Stetson, 130 Mass 76
(1881); Hewett v Chapman, 49 Mich 4 (1882); White v State, 73 Miss 50 (1895); Lucas v
State, 211 Miss 339 (1951); Pennington v Kansas C R Co., 201 Mo App 483 (1919); Chicago
R I v Collier, 1 Neb Unof 278 (1901); State v Finch, 54 Or 482 (1909); Howser v Common-
wealth, 51 Pa 332 (1866) (applies'to both criminal and civil cases); Follansbee v Walker, 74
Pa 306 (1873); Hull v Seaboard, 76 SC 278 (1907); People v Thiede, 11 Utah 241 (1895).
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In Connecticut, for example, at least until 1822, a juror was
competent to serve as a witness.84 And in Massachusetts in the
1830s jurors were permitted to be witnesses. 5 If a juror had direct
knowledge that rendered him partial, however, the court would ex-
clude him."8 This rule has been followed as recently as 1989.87 It is
not clear how often jurors served as witnesses. It is possible that in
practice jurors rarely had direct knowledge, and that those who did
were excluded before trial. Jurors today are regularly excluded,
however, if they have any direct, knowledge."8
2. Vicarious Knowledge and Judging Credibility.
Nineteenth-century courts did not flatly prohibit jurors from
using vicarious knowledge. Concerns about interfering with the
jury's deliberations initially led federal courts to avoid ordering
new trials when it was suggested that a juror had shared vicarious
knowledge with the rest of the jury. 9 Just as in the case of direct
knowledge, jurors were required to disclose any vicarious knowl-
edge at trial under oath, but they were conspicuously not disquali-
fied as incompetent jurors.90 There was, however, no systematic ap-
proach to the issue. Broadly speaking, arguments fell into two
categories: practical and philosophical. The synthesis of these ar-
guments resulted in deference toward jurors' use of vicarious
knowledge when judging credibility or weighing evidence. This po-
Zephaniah Swift, Connecticut Digest of Laws 747, citing Peak. on Evidence at 10 n
2.
85 Patterson v Boston, 37 Mass 159, 166 (1838) (juror may use personal knowledge to
make an appraisement of damages, but any "particular fact, bearing on the questions at
issue" should be stated in open court, under oath); Murdock v Sumner, 39 Mass 156, 157
(1839) (after refusing to set aside a verdict because the jury chose to use a witness's valua-
tion of damages instead of their own knowledge, despite an instruction that the jury could
use their knowledge, the court noted that jurors may exercise "judgment" over the facts
presented by witnesses and that any fact a juror knew could have been testified to in court).
8 See, for example, Chess v Chess, 1 Penr & W 32, 43 (Pa 1829) (A juror requested to
be excused because he was going to be a character witness against an important defense
witness. The request was granted and upheld on appeal on the grounds that, while a juror is
not incompetent merely by virtue of being a witness in the same cause, if his knowledge
makes him partial, then he ought to be excluded.); State v Benton, 19 NC 196, 210-11
(1836).
" Dalkovski v Glad, 774 P2d 202, 204-06 (Alaska 1989) (a juror who knew non-inciden-
tal facts about the defendant's confusion over a land boundary in a case alleging the defend-
ant's misrepresentation of the boundary was prejudiced and should have been excluded).
" Wigmore, 6 Evidence § 1800 at 331; and 9 Evidence § 2570 at 726 (cited in note 6).
" See, for example, Cherry v Sweeny, 5 F Cases 557 (DC 1808).
11 See notes 83-90. See also United States v Sears, 27 F Cases 1006, 1008 (1812) (Jus-
tice Story agreeing that jurors must disclose vicarious knowledge at trial under oath); and
Mitchum v State, 11 Ga at 633 (in dicta, that jurors with vicarious knowledge of facts may
be sworn).
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sition was dominant until the late nineteenth century, when courts
began to narrow the scope of permissible vicarious knowledge.
Practically speaking, early American juries enjoyed a great
deal of laissez faire. Some courts expressed concerns about the
practical limitations of any rule that prohibited a juror's use of his
vicarious knowlege. The federal district court in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania was mindful of the danger of allowing jurors
to "put aside all the evidence of the cause, and bring together as
the foundation of their verdict, all the opinions, prejudices, rumors
and hearsays, that they may call their previous and personal
knowledge."9 But, as that court said in 1932,
a prohibition to the juror to avail himself of his knowl-
edge of the subject; to his giving a verdict on any ground
or for any reason he might think proper . . . would have
been [an] idle.., attempt to prohibit what [courts] Could
not prevent, for a juror may give his verdict as he wills to
do, and no body has a right to question him for his
reasons.
92
Some courts, however, made principled arguments in favor of
allowing jurors to use their vicarious knowledge. One of the strong-
est arguments for allowing jurors to use vicarious knowledge was
its importance in judging credibility. This argument was nearly
identical to the one advanced by Justice Vaughan nearly two cen-
turies before.9
For example, in Stettinius v United States,94 the court ex-
plained that "the jury are judges as well of the credibility of the
.witnesses, as of the truth of the fact, for possibly they might know
somewhat, of their own knowledge, that what was sworn was un-
true; and possibly they might know. the witnesses to be such as
they could not believe."95
Likewise, in Fox v State,96 the court held that a judge could
not act upon his personal knowledge of the character of a party or
a witness because that would be "assuming ... the province of the
jury; that is, the right to pass upon the credibility of the
witness." 97
US v Fourteen Packages of Pins, 25 F Cases 1182, 1190 (ED Pa 1832).
92 Id.
9 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep at 1012. See also text accompanying notes 24-26.
9' 22 F Cases 1322 (Cir Ct DC 1839).
Id at 1329-30.
9 Ga 373 (1851).
Id at 377.
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In a late nineteenth-century decision, the supreme court of
Georgia held that, since jurors could choose to believe one witness
over another without any more evidence, 98 they could also use per-
sonal knowledge to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 9 It was
also reversible error not to instruct the jury to use its personal
knowledge in judging the credibility of parties and witnesses."'
A similar argument was that jurors needed to rely on personal
knowledge in order to effectively weigh the evidence. Thus in the
federal district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in
1887,101 the court held that the "jury may apply [vicarious] knowl-
edge ... to the matters of fact in evidence in determining the
weight to be given to the opinions expressed .... [T]hey may and
should judge of the weight and force of that evidence by their own
general knowledge of the subject of inquiry; and while great weight
should always be given to the opinions, honestly and candidly ex-
pressed, of those witnesses, [the jury can disbelieve them]."' '
Typical of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
approach to jurors' use of vicarious knowledge in judging credibil-
ity is the case of M'Kain v Love. 103 The supreme court of South
Carolina in 1834 heard an appeal from a jury verdict for the de-
fendant in a trover action for a slave. The plaintiff alleged that
during the jury's deliberations, a juror inquired as to the credibil-
ity of one of the plaintiff's witnesses. George M. Perry told his fel-
low jurors that he had heard that the witness was the plaintiff's
"kept mistress."0 4 Several jurors admitted that this affected their
decision, while others admitted no such influence.1 05 The high
court conceded that the rule in South Carolina was that the "jury
are bound to give their verdict according to the evidence."'' 0 But
the court cautioned:
" Rogers v King, 12 Ga 229, 233-35 (1852).
" Anderson v Tribble, 66 Ga 584, 589 (1881) (an instruction that the jury were to judge
the party's "intelligence, his manner of testifying on the stand, and his integrity and up-
rightness, character for veracity, if you know what that is" was not erroneous as a matter of
law); Head v Bridges, 67 Ga 227, 237 (1881) (same instruction as in Tribble, 66 Ga at 589;
the court held that witnesses must be passed upon by the jury, which is why jurors come
from the vicinage "as being most likely to be proved by witnesses, and charged upon persons
with whose integrity and reputation they were best acquainted").
'0 Howard v State, 73 Ga 83 (1884).
101 Laflin v Chicago, W. & N. R. Co., 33 F 415, 424 (Cir Ct ED Wis 1887).
102 Id at 422.
103 13 SC 188 (1834).
10. Id at 188.
1o Id.
106 Id. at 189.
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[T]his rule must be understood, however, with some limi-
tations. The constitution of the trial by jury pre-supposes
that they will act, in some degree, from their own knowl-
edge of the character of the parties and their witnesses. It
is for this reason that the jurors are drawn from the vici-
nage, and any effort to restrain by rule the influence of
the many collateral circumstances which enter into al-
most every complicated case, from having their own
weight inthe consideration of a jury, would be as vain as
to attempt to prescribe rules for the operation of the
human mind. 10 7
The court went on to say:
[I]n nine cases out of ten, it is more than probable that
all of them [jurors] cannot be wholly ignorant of the mat-
ters in dispute, or of the character of the parties and wit-
nesses, and it is expecting too much of human nature to
suppose, even if it was desirable, that this knowledge
should not enter into the judgment which they pro-
nounce on the facts. It ought to be so, for little incidents
which cannot be developed in evidence, and which may
be well understood by a jury, very often stamp upon a
transaction its true character, and this is more particu-
larly true with regard to credibility of witnesses."0 8
Echoing the arguments of Justice Vaughan in Bushell's Case, Jus-
tice Johnson noted that juries may "have evidence of their own
cognizance of the matter before them, or they may find on distrust
of the witnesses on their own proper knowledge" and that this is
the nature of the service that jurors are asked to perform.0 9
Perhaps most forceful among Justice Johnson's arguments,
however, is a practical one. Assuming that jurors possess vicarious
knowledge and use it, Justice Johnson explained that jurors would
never reach a verdict if they were prohibited from sharing their
knowledge with each other:
[A]ny juror is bound to respond according to his own
conscience, and if he is restrained from giving his reasons
for his opinions, and each were to act from his own
knowledge, it is not probable that they would ever agree.
"' M'Kain, 13 SC at 189.
108 Id (emphasis added).
109 Id.
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We know from experience, that in questions admitting of
any doubt, the only possible means of arriving at una-
nimity of opinion amongst many, is by a free interchange
of thought, and to deny it to a jury would be to defeat
the object of the trial by jury.1 '
Justice Johnson concluded his analysis by noting that, because the
information was revealed as rumor, the juror's use of it was not
objectionable-or at least not as objectionable."'
Courts and legislatures in the late nineteenth century began to
narrow the permissible use of vicarious knowledge. Several states
enacted statutes prohibiting jurors' use of personal knowledge in
the late nineteenth century." 2 In Georgia in 1892, the state's high-
est court heard another civil appeal from a verdict that was given
according to an instruction to use vicarious knowledge in judging
credibility.'13 The court expressly overruled its previous cases that
had established the rule, arguing that those cases provided no sup-
port for the proposition that jurors should ever use such knowl-
edge." The case itself scarcely addressed the rule it abolished, but
the reporter of the case wrote in the headnote, "Jurors should not
be instructed that they can act upon their private and personal
knowledge of the character of the witnesses . . . and it is error for
the court to instruct them that they can consider such character if
they know it.""' 5
It is possible that the Georgia Supreme Court, although wish-
ing to avoid a trial court's explicit instruction authorizing use of
vicarious knowledge, did not attempt to disturb the jury's right to
use such knowledge. In response to the ambiguity, the Georgia leg-
... M'Kain, 13 SC at 189-90.
' "[Olne of the jurors stated a fact that he had heard derogatory to [the witness's]
character, but he stated it as a rumor, without, in any manner, giving it his own sanction."
Id at 190.
" See, for example, Ala Code § 12-16-7 (1975) (enacted 1852 as § 648); Cal Pen Code
§ 1120 (as amended 1965) (enacted 1872); Ga Code Ann § 9-10-6 (Michie 1989) (enacted
1895 as § 5337); Idaho Code § 19-2125 (1989) (enacted 1864 as § 378); Ind Code tit 35, art
37, ch 2, § 3a-b (1978) (enacted 1905 as ch 169 § 262); Kan Stat Ann §§ 62-1408, 62-1445
(1964) (enacted 1868 as ch 82 § 234, reversing the rule set out in ch 27 § 183 (enacted
1859)); Ky Rev Ann Stat § 29.320 (1986) (enacted 1893 as ch 210 p 948 § 14); Minn Stat
§ 631.05 (1983) (enacted 1858 as ch 114 § 42); Mo Rev Stat § 546.140 (1953) (enacted 1816
as 1 Terr L § 7 at 447); NY Crim Pro Law § 270.40 (McKinney 1971) (enacted 1881 as Code
Crim Pro § 415); ND Cent Code § 29-21-18 (1974) (enacted 1877 as C Crim P § 362); Okla
Stat tit 22, § 852 (1971) (enacted 1890 as § 5658); Wash Rev Code § 5.60.010 (1963) (enacted
1869 as 59 § 232); W Va Code § 56-6-18 (1966) (enacted 1849 as ch 162 § 11).
113 Chattanooga Railroad Co. v Owen, 90 Ga 265 (1892).




islature joined the growing ranks of states prohibiting the use of
personal knowledge.116
By the early part of the twentieth century, despite nearly
unanimous statutory prohibitions, some states continued to allow
instructions that juries could use personal knowledge. Other states
prohibited such instructions, but affirmed a juror's ability to use
personal knowledge as long as it was not a substitute for evidence.
In either case, a juror's ability to use personal knowledge in the
twentieth century was only modestly diminished.
For example, the California Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
approved of the trial judge's instruction that the jury "may and
should judge of the weight and force of the evidence upon your
own general knowledge of the subject of the inquiry."'1 7 The su-
preme court of Iowa likewise decided in 1933 that an instruction
that jurors use personal knowledge in assessing damages is permis-
sible so long as their knowledge itself is not considered as a substi-
tute for evidence. " 8
When given an opportunity to redress its rule, the supreme
court of Georgia spoke most fluently:
It was certainly error to charge the jury that, in ascer-
taining the value of lands .. . , they might consider not
only the evidence, but their own knowledge as to the
value of land in the country. Juries should decide ques-
tions of fact according to the evidence introduced before
them, and their personal knowledge certainly cannot con-
stitute part of the evidence.1 9
But the court went on to explain:
A jury must arrive at their verdict from evidence regu-
larly produced in the course of the trial proceedings, and
may properly call to their aid their own knowledge, learn-
ing and experience, and any information gained from a
view of the premises in weighing the evidence, but their
verdict must be supported by evidence and cannot rest
solely upon a view of the premises or their knowledge of
the values of land.12 0
"' Ga Code Ann § 9-10-6. It has been noted that this statute was passed in response to
the court's holding in Chattanooga, 90 Ga 265.
,,7 Vallejo & Northern RR Co. v Reed, 169 Cal 545, 576-77 (1915).
... In re Estate of Stencil, 215 Iowa 1195, 1197-98 (1933).
,,9 State Hwy Dept of Georgia v Andrus, 212' Ga 737, 738 (1956), quoting Gibson v
Carreker, 91 Ga 617, 620 (1893).
I"O Andrus, 212 Ga at 739.
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Both excerpted portions speak as clearly to the issue of vicari-
ous knowledge as they do to direct knowledge. In all cases, a juror
may use personal knowledge of general repute or common informa-
tion to buttress evidence presented in court or to evaluate such
evidence. Direct knowledge had been prohibited on the grounds
that it took the place of evidence that should be presented publicly
at trial.121 The twentieth-century courts similarly limited the use
of vicarious knowledge. 12 2 This, however, is no more than the rule
123expressed as early as 1830 in M'Kain v Love, or in the early
nineteenth-century opinion cases.1 24
In practice, of course, any reliance on vicarious knowledge
does take the place of evidence. It might follow that vicarious
knowledge, like direct knowledge, should be subject to the safe-
guards inherent to public testimony. However, vicarious knowledge
has been less troubling to courts. Courts might have made the dis-
tinction because of a belief that other jurors would have some vica-
rious knowledge themselves to confirm or rebut the assertion of
another juror. Therefore, the need for the protections of public tes-
timony might have become obviated.
Treating several mid-twentieth century cases, Professor Mans-
field showed how modern courts still adhere to the rule established
early in this century. He identified three concerns about jurors' use
of personal knowledge.' 25 Relevant among them are concerns about
fair notice and reliability. 2 6 He found that jury verdicts based
upon one juror's direct knowledge were consistently vitiated on the
grounds of reliability,12 7 yet juries were allowed to use vicarious
knowledge as the concerns for notice and reliability were substan-
tially diminished.'28
Thus has the American rule developed over time, allowing ju-
rors to use vicarious knowledge as long as that knowledge did not
raise a fixed and abiding opinion about the merits of the case. Di-
rect knowledge, on the other hand, which in character is testimony
as to something that has passed before the declarant, has never
been properly used by a juror. Instead, the rule as stated by Black-
121 See text accompanying notes 76-80.
' See text accompanying notes 117-20.
123 See text accompanying notes 103-11.
' See text accompanying notes 34-75.
... Mansfield, 74 Georgetown L J at 397-401 (cited in note 3).
12' Mansfield's third concern is political entitlement, such as the Constitutional rights
to confrontation or to due process of law. Id at 399-401.
Id at 398-99.
118 Id at 397-98.
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stone required that the juror be sworn and give his testimony in
open court, subject to cross-examination. During the nineteenth
century it became settled that jurors who had direct personal
knowledge were excluded as prejudiced.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has described the kinds of personal knowledge
that American juries were traditionally permitted to use. A study
of American sources, including statutes, cases and treatises, has re-
vealed that American juries have never been entirely ignorant. In
practice, courts have allowed a great deal of juror knowledge. To
understand the depth of theory and politics at work in this evolu-
tion is to understand more fully the rules of evidence and the con-
troversial powers juries exercise.
Early American courts relied very heavily upon a jury's ability
to inject popular notions into the law. By the end of the nineteenth
century, however, juries were restricted in what knowledge they
could bring to the jury box. Jurors with direct knowledge were reg-
ularly excluded. However, jurors were permitted to use vicarious
knowledge as long as they did not have a fixed opinion on the mer-
its of the case. This vicarious knowledge was not subject to the
same concerns for veracity as direct knowledge, which had been
consistently prohibited from jury consideration from the earliest
American cases. In the twentieth century, judges have applied the
same rules with slightly less deference to jury knowledge.
The current debate on juror knowledge manifests itself in the
discussion of related questions. In the most extreme case it can be
found in the debate over whether there ought to be juries with spe-
cial knowledge, such as in technical scientific cases or in compli-
cated antitrust cases.1" 9 Other times the subject arises in the con-
text of jury nullification. More recently, people have questioned
the propriety of empanelling ignorant jurors in cases that reach na-
tional prominence. And the question of juror knowledge always
plays a role in the debates over the rules of evidence. In each case,
our search for answers will prove more productive if it is conducted
with a firm grounding in our country's unique experience with
juries.
'" See Comment, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Fed-
eral Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U Chi Legal F 575.
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